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EXTENSIVE LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION AND EMERGING SOCIAL ETHICS FOR
ANIMALS
Bernard E. Rollin
Department of Philosophy, Colorado State University
Fort Collins, Colorado  80523
      The last 50 years have witnessed a dazzling array of social ethical revolutions in
Western society.  Such moral movements as feminism, civil rights, environmentalism,
affirmative action, consumer advocacy, homosexual rights, children’s rights, the student
movement, antiwar activism, public rejection of biotechnology, have forever changed the way
governments and public institutions comport themselves.  And this is equally true for private
enterprise; to be successful, businesses must be seen as operating solidly in harmony with
changing and emerging social ethics.  It is arguable that morally based boycotting of South
African business was instrumental in bringing about the end of apartheid, and similar boycotting
of some farm products in the U.S. led to significant improvements in the living situations of farm
workers.  It is de rigeur for major corporations to have reasonable numbers of minorities visibly
peopling their ranks, and for liquor companies to advertise on behalf of moderation in alcohol
consumption.  Cigarette companies now press upon the public a message that cigarettes kill, and
extol their involvement in protecting battered women; and forestry and oil companies spend
millions (even billions) to persuade the public of their environmental commitments.  CNN
recently reported that “green” investment funds are growing significantly faster than ordinary
funds, and reports of child labor or sweatshop working conditions can literally destroy product
markets overnight.
One major social ethical concern that has developed over the last three decades is a
significant emphasis on the treatment of animals used by society for various purposes.  It is easy to
demonstrate the degree to which these concerns have seized the public imagination.  According to
both the U.S. National Cattlemen’s Beef Association and the National Institutes of Health (the latter
being the source of funding for 85-90% of biomedical research in the U.S.), both groups not
inclined to exaggerate the influence of animal ethics, by the mid-1990s Congress had been
consistently receiving more letters, phone calls, faxes, e-mails and personal contacts on animal-
related issues than on any other topic.1
Whereas 20 years ago one would have found no bills pending in the U.S. Congress relating
to animal welfare, the last 5 to 6 years have witnessed 50-60 such bills annually, with even more
proliferating at the state level.  The federal bills range from attempts to prevent duplication in
animal research, to saving marine mammals from becoming victims of tuna fishermen, to
preventing importation of ivory, to curtailing the parrot trade.  State laws passed in large numbers
have increasingly prevented the use of live or dead shelter animals for biomedical research and
training and have focused on myriad other areas of animal welfare.  Numerous states have abolished
the steel-jawed leghold trap.  When Colorado’s politically appointed Wildlife Commission failed to
act on a recommendation from the Division of Wildlife to abolish the spring bear hunt (because
hunters were liable to shoot lactating mothers, leaving their orphaned cubs to die of starvation), the
general public ended the hunt through a popular referendum.  Seventy percent of Colorado’s
population voted for that constitutional amendment.  In Ontario, the environmental minister stopped
a similar hunt by executive fiat in response to social ethical concern.  California abolished the
hunting of mountain lions, and state fishery management agencies have taken a hard look at catch-
and-release programs on humane grounds.
In fact, wildlife managers have worried, in academic journals, about “management by
referendum.”  According to the director of the American Quarter Horse Association, the number of
state bills related to horse welfare filled a telephone-book-sized volume in 1998 alone.  Public
sentiment for equine welfare in California carried a bill through the state legislature making the
slaughter of horses or shipping of horses for slaughter a felony in that state.  Municipalities have
passed ordinances ranging from the abolition of rodeos, circuses, and zoos to the protection of
prairie dogs and, in the case of Cambridge, Massachusetts (a biomedical Mecca), the strictest laws
in the world regulating research.
Even more dramatic, perhaps, is the worldwide proliferation of laws to protect laboratory
animals.  In the United States, for example, two major pieces of legislation regulating and
constraining the use and treatment of animals in research were passed by the U.S. Congress in 1985,
despite vigorous opposition from the powerful biomedical research and medical lobbies.  This
opposition included well-financed, highly visible advertisements and media promotions indicating
that human health and medical progress would be harmed by implementation of such legislation.
There was even a less than subtle film titled “Will I be All Right, Doctor?”, the query coming from
a sick child, the response coming from a pediatrician who affirmed, in essence, “You will be if
‘they’ leave us alone to do as we wish with animals.”  With social concern for laboratory animals
unmitigated by such threats, research animal protection laws moved easily through Congress and
have been implemented at considerable cost to taxpayers.  In 1986, Britain superseded its
pioneering act of 1876 with new laws aimed at strengthening public confidence in the welfare of
experimental animals.  Many other European countries have moved or are moving in a similar
direction, despite the fact that some 90% of laboratory animals are rats and mice, not the most
lovable of animals.
Many animal uses seen as frivolous by the public have been abolished without legislation.
Toxicological testing of cosmetics on animals has been truncated; companies such as the Body
Shop have been wildly successful internationally by totally disavowing such testing, and free-range
egg production is a growth industry across the world.  Greyhound racing has declined, in part for
animal welfare reasons, with the Indiana veterinary community spearheading the effort to prevent
greyhound racing from coming into the state.  Zoos that are little more than prisons for animals (the
state of the art during my youth) have all but disappeared, and the very existence of zoos is being
increasingly challenged, despite the public’s unabashed love of seeing animals.  And, as Gaskell
and his associates’ work has revealed2 , genetic engineering has been rejected in Europe not, as
commonly believed, for reasons of risk but for reasons of ethics; in part for reasons of animal ethics.
Similar reasons (i.e., fear of harming cattle) have, in part, driven European rejection of bovine
somatotropin (BST).  Rodeos such as the Houston Livestock Show have, in essence, banned jerking
of calves in roping, despite opposition from the Professional Rodeo Cowboys Association, who
themselves never show the actual roping of a calf on national television.
Inevitably, agriculture has felt the force of social concern with animal treatment — indeed, it
is arguable that contemporary concern in society with the treatment of farm animals in modern
production systems blazed the trail leading to a new ethic for animals.  As early as 1965, British
society took notice of what the public saw as an alarming tendency to industrialize animal
agriculture by chartering the Brambell Commission, a group of scientists under the leadership of Sir
Rogers Brambell, who affirmed that any agricultural system failing to meet the needs and natures of
animals was morally unacceptable.  Though the Brambell Commission recommendations enjoyed
no regulatory status, they served as a moral lighthouse for European social thought.  In 1988, the
Swedish Parliament passed, virtually unopposed, what the New York Times called a “Bill of Rights”
for farm animals, abolishing in Sweden, in a series of timed steps, the confinement systems
currently dominating North American agriculture.3  Much of northern Europe has followed suit, and
the European Union is moving in a similar direction.  Very recently, activists in the U.S. have
turned their attention to animal agriculture, and it is reasonable to expect U.S. society to eventually
demand changes similar to those that have occurred in Europe.
What is the nature of the emerging new ethical thinking that underlies and informs the
dramatic social changes just discussed?  Although society has always had an articulated ethic
regarding animal treatment, that ethic has been very minimalistic, leaving most of the issue of
animal treatment to people’s personal ethic, rather than to the social ethic.  Since Biblical times, the
social ethic has forbidden deliberate, willful, sadistic, deviant, purposeless, unnecessary infliction of
pain and suffering on animals, or outrageous neglect, such as not feeding or watering.  Beginning in
the early nineteenth century, this set of prohibitions was articulated in the anti-cruelty statutes of the
laws in all civilized societies.  But even in Biblical and medieval times, the social ethic inveighed
against cruelty.  The Old Testament injunctions against yoking an ox and an ass together to a plow,
or muzzling the ox when it is being used to mill grain, or seething a calf in its mother’s milk, all
reflect concern with and abhorrence for what the Rabbinical tradition called tsaar baale chaiim; the
suffering of living things.  In the Middle Ages, St. Thomas Aquinas, while affirming that lacking a
soul, animals enjoyed no moral status, nonetheless strictly forbade cruelty, on the grounds that
permitting such behavior towards animals would encourage its spreading to human beings, an
insight buttressed by over two decades of recent research.  Numerous serial killers have evidenced
early abusive behavior towards animals, as have many of the youths in the U.S. who in recent years
wrought massacres on their peers.
For the overwhelming majority of human history, until some three decades ago in fact, the
anti-cruelty ethic served as the only socially articulated moral principle for animal treatment.
Except for a few sporadic voices following in the wake of Darwin’s articulation of human-animal
continuity, no one spoke of animals’ rights, nor did society have moral concepts for animal
treatment that went “beyond cruelty.” The obvious question that presents itself is this: What has
occurred during the last half century which led to social disaffection with the venerable ethic of
anti-cruelty?
In a study commissioned by USDA to answer this question I distinguished a variety of social
and conceptual reasons:4
1) Changing demographics and consequent changes in the paradigm for animals:
Whereas at the turn of the century, more than half the population was engaged in producing
food for the rest, today only some 1.5% of the U.S. public is engaged in production agriculture.
One hundred years ago, if one were to ask a person in the street, urban or rural, to state the words
that come into their mind when one says “animal,” the answer would doubtless have been “horse,”
“cow,” “food,” “work,” etc.  Today, however, for the majority of the population, the answer is
“dog,” “cat,” “pet.”  Almost 100% of the pet-owning population views their animals as “members
of the family,” and virtually no one views them as an income source.  Divorce lawyers note that
custody of the dog can be as thorny an issue as custody of the children!
2) We have lived through a long period of ethical soul-searching
For almost 50 years society has turned its “ethical searchlight” on humans traditionally
ignored or even oppressed by the consensus ethic — blacks, women, the handicapped, other
minorities.  The same ethical imperative has focused attention on our treatment of the non-human
world — the environment and animals.  Many leaders of the activist animal movement in fact have
roots in earlier movements — civil rights, feminism, homosexual rights, children’s rights, labor.
3) The media has discovered that “animals sell papers”
One cannot channel-surf across normal television service without being bombarded with
animal stories, real and fictional.  Recall, for example, the extensive media coverage a decade ago
of some whales trapped in an ice-floe, and freed by a Russian ice-breaker.  This was hardly an
overflowing of Russian compassion – an oxymoronic notion applied to a people who gave us
pogroms, gulags, and Stalinism.  Rather, someone in the Kremlin was bright enough to realize that
liberating the whales was an extremely cheap way to score points in U.S. public opinion.
4) Strong and visible arguments have been advanced in favor of raising the status of animals by
philosophers, scientists and celebrities
5) Changes in the nature of animal use demanded new moral categories
In my view, while all of the reasons listed above are relevant, they are nowhere nearly as
important as the precipitous and dramatic changes in animal use that occurred after World War II.
These changes were first of all huge conceptual changes in the nature of agriculture and second the
rise of significant amounts of animal research and testing.
For virtually all of human history, animal agriculture was based foursquare in animal
husbandry.  Husbandry, derived from the old Norse word “hus/band,” bonded to the household,
meant taking great pains to put one’s animals into the best possible environment one could find to
meet their physical and psychological natures (what Aristotle and I call telos), and then augmenting
their ability to survive and thrive by providing them with food during famine, protection from
predation, water during drought, medical attention, help in birthing, and so on.  Thus traditional
agriculture was roughly a fair contact between humans and animals, with both sides being better off
in virtue of the relationship.  Husbandry agriculture was about putting square pegs into square holes,
round pegs into round holes, and creating as little friction as possible doing so.  So powerful is the
notion of husbandry, in fact, that when the Psalmist seeks a metaphor for God’s ideal relationship to
humans, he seizes upon the shepherd in the 23rd Psalm:
 The Lord is my shepherd I shall not want.  He leadeth me to green pastures; He
maketh me to lie down beside still waters; He restoreth my soul.
We wish no more from God than what the husbandman provides for his sheep.  In husbandry, a
producer did well if and only if the animals did well, so productivity was tied to welfare.  No social
ethic was thus needed to ensure proper animal treatment; only the anti-cruelty ethic designed to deal
with sadists and psychopaths was needed to augment husbandry.  Self-interest virtually assured
good treatment.
After World War II, this beautiful contract was broken by humans.  Symbolically,
Departments of Animal Husbandry became Departments of Animal Science, defined not as care,
but as “the application of industrial methods to the production of animals” to increase efficiency and
productivity.  With “technological sanders” — hormones, vaccines, antibiotics, air–handling
systems, mechanization — we could force square pegs into round holes, and place animals into
environments where they suffered in ways irrelevant to productivity.  If a nineteenth century
agriculturalist had tried to put 100,000 egg laying hens in cages in a building, they all would have
died of disease in a month; today such systems dominate.
Here is the critical point: although this new agriculture causes a great deal of animal
suffering, it is not deliberate, willful cruelty.  Confinement agriculturalists are not cruel, they are
simply trying to ensure a cheap and plentiful food supply.  So if society wishes to express moral
doubts about this new approach to agriculture, it needs new moral concepts beyond cruelty.
Exactly the same point holds regarding the use of massive amounts of research and testing
after World War II.  Although researchers and toxicologists are not cruel — they are attempting to
cure disease and ensure product safety — they create large amounts of suffering in the animals they
use with no compensatory benefit to those animals, though certainly benefit accrues to humans and
to animals in general.
It is this radical change in the fairness of animal use which is the most significant factor
informing the demand for a new ethic for animals in society.  But new ethics are not spun out of
nothing.  Ethical change comes out of realization of implications of our prior ethical commitments,
as when U.S. society realized that eliminating segregation was a logical consequence of our
constitutional commitment to equality.  So it was inevitable that when society sought new ethical
concepts to express its ethical concern for the loss of fairness in animal use, it would look to its
ethical machinery for judging treatment of humans for a basis.  And the relevant concepts to
appropriate were obvious:
Every human society forces a conflict between two sets of goods — the good of the group
and the good of the individual.  It may benefit the society to send young men to war — it does not
benefit those individuals.  Similarly, it benefits society in general to redistribute the fortunes of the
superwealthy; it certainly does not benefit those individuals.  Historically, the vast majority of
societies — and all totalitarian ones — have unequivocally favored the good of the state, Reich,
Volk, Church or whatever the corporate entity in question.  The only exceptions who have favored
the individual are short-lived anarchistic societies, such as the hippie communes of the 1960's.
Democratic societies, however, have effected Solomonic balance between the extremes
delineated.  Although we do of necessity make the majority of our social decisions by reference to
the common good, we put serious limits on those decisions to protect individuals.  In fact, we place
protective fences around human individuals to protect them even from the general welfare.
Specifically, we protect those interests that we consider essential to one’s humanity, to our human
nature, in the law — saying what we wish, believing and worshiping as we wish, holding on to our
property, not being tortured and so on.  These protective fences are called rights, and they are in
essence a moral notion with legal force.
It should be evident that society, seeking an ethic for animals that goes beyond cruelty for all
of the reasons delineated above, would “recollect” the rights notion that figures so prominently in
our human ethics and apply it, appropriately modified, to the treatment of animals.  For it is not
animal use per se that ordinary people object to, but unfair, unconstrained use of the sort that takes
place in the worst of confinement agriculture.  Roughly the same percentage of the public (85%)
that said animals have rights in a 1991 Parents Magazine survey5 said that animal use for human
benefit was acceptable, provided the animals live decent lives, a view echoed in other surveys.
Clearly, animals have natures — the “pigness” of the pig, the “dogness” of the dog, and so
on.  From these natures flow fundamental interests essential to that nature — being with others of
their own kind for social animals, being able to move for grazing animals, being able to eat an
appropriate diet, curtailing pain we inflict, etc.  If respect for those natures and the corresponding
interests no longer follows naturally as it did in husbandry agriculture, people are demanding that
such respect be conventionally established, through the legal and regulatory systems.  Thus the
administrators responsible for enforcing the laboratory animal laws my colleagues and I wrote and
which passed the U.S. Congress in 1985 said to me that these laws do establish some basic rights
for animals, including control of research-induced pain and mandating of living environments that
“enhance the psychological well-being of primates.”  As mentioned earlier, the Swedish law of
1988 was termed by the New York Times “a bill of rights for farm animals.”  And the same moral
reasoning also explains the proliferation of laws and bills to protect animals — if respect for their
basic interests, needs, and natures (what I call their telos following Aristotle) no longer occurs out
of necessity, society wishes to see it established by law.
The relevance of all this to extensive cattle ranching should be clear.  Stated simply, in the
U.S. at least, western cattle ranchers are the last agriculturalists practicing husbandry in the
traditional sense, where how one lives and how one treats one’s animals are as important — or more
important — than productivity, efficiency, and the bottom line, as evidenced by a bold statement
once made by the president of the Colorado Cattlemen’s Association:  “If I had to raise animals the
way the [confinement] veal people do, I would get the hell out of the business.”  Thus Western
extensive ranchers raise animals in exactly the manner the society ever-increasingly demands!
A few years ago, I experienced some sharply contrasting incidents which highlight the moral
differences between intensive and extensive agriculture.  That particular year, Colorado ranchers
were afflicted by a significant amount of scours.  Over two months, I talked to a half dozen rancher
friends of mine.  Every single one had had trouble with scours, and every one had spent more on
treating the disease than was economically justified by the calves’ monetary value.  When I asked
these men why they were being what an economist would term “economically irrational,” they were
quite adamant in their response: “Its part of my bargain with the animal; part of caring for them,”
one of them said.
It is, of course, the same ethical outlook that leads ranch wives to sit up all night with sick,
marginal calves, sometimes for days in a row.  If the issue were strictly economic, these people
would hardly be valuing their time at 50¢ per hour — including their sleep time!
Now in contrast to these uplifting moral attitudes, consider the following: One of my animal
scientist colleagues related to me that his son-in-law was an employee in a large, total confinement
swine operation.  As a young man he had raised and shown pigs, keeping them semi-extensively.
One day he detected a disease among the feeder pigs in the confinement facility where he works,
which necessitated killing them with a blow to the head, since these operations do not treat
individual animals, their profit margin being allegedly too low.  Out of his long established
husbandry ethic, he came in on his own time with his own medicine to treat the animals.  He cured
them!  Management’s response was to fire him on the stop for violating company policy!  He kept
his job and escaped with a reprimand only when he was able to prove that he had expended his own
— not the company’s— resources.  He has continued to work for them, but feels that his health has
suffered in virtue of what I have called the “moral stress” he experiences every day; the stress
growing out of the conflict between what he is told to do and how he morally believes he should be
treating the animals.  The above-detailed contrasting incidents, better than anything else I know,
eloquently illustrates the large gap between the ethics of husbandry and industry.
Twenty years ago, I argued to ranchers that they should not oppose the animal rights/animal
welfare thrust in society.  (As I hope I have shown, animal rights is just the way of expressing
animal welfare concerns in the context of radically changed animal usage.)  I argued that liaison
with animal advocates would enlist a new and powerful group of allies to help ranchers keep
reasonable grazing fees, for the animal people could be made to realize that the inevitable
alternative to reasonable grazing is some form of high confinement.  I still believe that.  And I still
beseech the ranching community to find more natural allies than they have done in the past.
That the animals raised by ranchers live decent lives should be — and is — a point of pride
with ranchers.  Why, then, should it not be a selling point?  Ironically, for 15 years, Frank Perdue, a
highly intensive producer, sold chicken on the East Coast of the U.S. with TV ads showing chickens
outdoors pecking in the barnyard, a red barn and a red sun framing them, while the ad announced
that “At Perdue, we raise happy chickens.” “Green” is a major selling point for many industries —
why not animal happiness?
As I often ask my rancher audiences: “Suppose God came down with an eleventh
commandment: ‘You may consume animals, but you can’t hurt them in the process.’ Would
intensive poultry and pork go out of business?  Of course!  Would cow–calf people?  Of course
not!”  That thought experiment shows that whatever animal suffering accompanies cow-calf
production is inessential and, as in any husbandry-based system, actually deleterious to making a
living and animal productivity.  Thus, I argue, the industry should get rid of those practices that do
cause pain and suffering, and take pride in a welfare-friendly philosophy.  The major practices in
question are of course dehorning without anesthesia and analgesia, castration without anesthesia and
analgesia, and hot-iron branding.
Though this is not the place to discuss alternatives in detail. I believe, and have argued
elsewhere, that there are alternatives to these management practices that could be readily
accomplished.  For example, an alternative to castrating is not castrating.  As one Wyoming rancher
put it to me: “We cut off their nuts with no anesthesia and get dinged by the public for being
inhumane.  We then put their nuts in their ears and get dinged by the public for adulterating the food
supply.  And, worst of all, the ears don’t work as well as the nuts!”  As far as branding is concerned,
I have pursued alternatives for 18 years, and believe I have found one — retinal imaging — which I
am happy to discuss with anyone.  And certainly introducing the poll gene or using local blocks and
xylazine on young animals are both viable approaches to dehorning.  In any case, the industry
should at least be actively pursuing alternatives to demonstrate to the public their good faith in
trying to end practices that cause pain and suffering.
To sum up: What I have called the “new ethic for animals” emerging in society is in essence
a demand for legal guarantees that animals’ natures will not be violated for human benefit.
Extensive agriculture in principle meets that new ethic because it was developed when producers
were required to accommodate animal natures to be successful, lacking the technological fixes
required for intensive agriculture.  (In addition, extensive agriculture is far more compatible with
environmental concerns than is confinement agriculture, thus according with another major
international socio-ethical concern.)
Thus the new social ethic strongly favors extensive livestock production, provided such
production does not rely on abusive management practices such as hot-iron branding and castration
without anesthesia or analgesia.  If such practices were eliminated, extensively produced livestock
could be marketed as “the ethical product.”  This in turn could help save the family ranches that are
threatened in the U.S. and Canada, and could provide excellent markets for livestock from
developing countries to Europe and North America, provided those countries provide husbandry,
not merely turn the animals loose, as was at one time done in Australia.
An economist for the National Cattlemen’s Association recently told me that, statistically, a
U.S. rancher will at best break even over this course of his life unless he has some special
“gimmick” by which to tap special markets.  Environmental soundness is one such “gimmick,”
meeting the new social ethic for animals is another.  In this way extensive producers can do well
while doing good.
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